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This paper studies how subjectivity in capitalist culture can be characterized. Building on
Lacan’s later seminars XVI, XVII, XVIII, and XIX, the author first outlines Lacan’s general
discourse theory, which includes four characteristic discourses: the discourse of the
master, the discourse of the university, the discourse of the hysteric and the discourse
of the analyst. Next, the author explores the subjectivity and the mode of dealing with
jouissance and semblance, which is entailed in a fifth type of discourse, the capitalist
discourse, discussed by Lacan (1972). Indeed, like the other discourses that Lacan
discerns, the discourse of the capitalist can be thought of as a mode of dealing with
the sexual non-rapport. It is argued that in the case of neurosis the discourse of the
capitalist functions as an attempt to ignore the sexual non-rapport and the dimension
of the unconscious. Psychosis, by contrast, is marked by an a priori exclusion from
discourse. In that case, consumerist ways of relating to the other might offer a semblance,
and thus the possibility of inventing a mode of relating to the other. Two clinical vignettes
are presented to illustrate this perspective: one concerning the neurotic structure and
one concerning the psychotic structure.
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INTRODUCTION
The idea that a consumerist culture has permeated the fabric of society is nothing new. Not
only is there little public discussion on alternatives for the free market, this model has pervaded
our social-cultural life (McGowan, 2004; Sennett, 2006; Verhaeghe, 2014; Mura, 2015). Several
authors suggest that capitalism imposes the customs of market-oriented thinking on all domains
of our life, profoundly affecting the way we experience and make sense of ourselves and others.
Indeed, nowadays capitalism shapes our experience of subjectivity. Marcuse (1964) suggests that
capitalism integrates people in a model of consumerism, where they work and consume more
than they need. This not only has damaging effects on the environment and on social life, but also
contaminatesmental life by installing false needs that people want to satisfy. Sennett (2006) suggests
that contemporary capitalist culture implies a passion for self-destruction linked to increased
consumption and Verhaeghe (2014) argues that, with their strong focus on success and happiness,
both capitalism and neoliberal culture destabilize the experience of identity.
In this paper I focus on the later work of Jacques Lacan to study how we can characterize the
relation between the subject and the other, and between subject and object in a capitalist culture.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, Lacan occasionally discussed the impact of capitalist culture on subject
formation. In line with his general idea that the human subject comes into existence through the
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play of signifiers1, which originate from the symbolic order, in
this period of his work he also assumed that the symbolic order of
capitalismmolds the subject in a particular way. Capitalist culture
affects the way we deal with distress and suffering; it shapes the
way we relate to others; it determines the way the unconscious
functions; and it influences the kind of request for help that
an individual might extend to a psychoanalyst. Indeed, early in
the nineteen seventies Lacan (1972) indicated that the capitalist
discourse had started to replace the traditional discourse of the
master. The classic figure of the other, which largely rests on the
structure of the discourse of the master, had faded away (Žižek,
1999), affecting the subject to the extent that a reconsideration of
how we work clinically is needed (Miller, 1993).
As I take up Lacan’s line of reasoning, my interest is
mainly clinical. Other authors have studied Lacan’s discussion of
capitalism in terms of his overall engagement with the work of
Karl Marx (e.g., McGowan, 2004; Bryant, 2008; Pavón-Cuéllar,
2009, 2011; Bruno, 2010; Tomšicˇ, 2015). My objective differs
in that I focus on the structure of capitalism as articulated in
Lacan’s statements on the discourse of the capitalist (le discours
du capitaliste), and on its clinical implications. In 1972 Lacan
considered this discourse to be an amended version of the
discourse of the master.
Building on Seminars XVI, XVII, XVIII, and XIX, I first
outline Lacan’s overall discourse theory. I explain the four
positions of each discourse, the initial four discourses that
he discerns (i.e., discourse of the master, the university, the
hysteric and the analyst), and further changes that Lacan made
to his theory as he focuses on semblance, jouissance, surplus-
jouissance, and non-rapport. Following this, I explore how the
subject takes shape in the discourse of the capitalist and themode
of dealing with jouissance that Lacan’s fifth discourse entails.
Indeed, just like the other discourses that Lacan discerns, the
discourse of the capitalist can be thought of as a mode of dealing
with the sexual non-rapport. Finally, the clinical implications of
working with this discourse are presented. On the one hand
I review Lacan’s reflections on the figure of the saint, which
he contrasts with the capitalist, and proposes as model for the
psychoanalyst. On the other hand I discuss two clinical vignettes;
one that concerns the neurotic structure and one that concerns
the psychotic structure. In both cases I discuss how the capitalist
discourse takes shape, and point out that whereas in the context
of neurosis, the capitalist discourse bears witness to a strategy of
ignorance, it might have a stabilizing effect in psychosis.
ELEMENTS OF LACANIAN DISCOURSE
THEORY
Lacan (1969–1970) first elaborated his discourse theory in
Seminar XVII, where he discerns four discourses2: the discourse
of the master, the discourse of the university, the discourse of the
hysteric and the discourse of the analyst. These four discourses
1For example, this idea is addressed in the R-schema (Lacan, 1959) and in the
discourse of the master from Lacan’s discourse theory (Lacan, 1969–1970).
2Other discussions of Lacan’s discourse theory can be found in Clemens and Grigg
(2006), Bracher (1994), Verhaeghe (1995), and Žižek (2006).
all have the same structure, and consist of four positions: agent,
top left; other, top right; truth, bottom left; product, bottom right
(Figure 1)3 connected via a fixed set of arrows.
What is essential to the four discourses is that a desiring4
“agent” addresses an “other,” which is indicated by the horizontal
upper arrow. In the move from “agent” to “other” we recognize
the human tendency to create social bonds. However, here
Lacan is not expressing some sort of romantic view on human
interrelations, but is stressing that the relationship between
“agent” and “other” is marked by a “disjunction of impossibility”
(Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 59; Bruno, 2010): the message that the agent
sends is never received as it was intended. Lacan (1969–1970, p.
174) explains this as follows: “The first line comprises a relation,
indicated here by an arrow, which is always defined as impossible.
In the master’s discourse, for instance, it is effectively impossible
that there be a master who makes the entire world function.
Getting people to work is even more tiring, if one really has to
do it, than working oneself.” Indeed, the agent’s address never
provokes a reciprocal reaction, which is why no returning arrow
connects the “other” back to the “agent” (see Figure 1).
The lower part of the formula highlights the hidden side of
discourse. The first position on the bottom left is “truth,” which
is connected to the position of the “agent” by an arrow pointing
upwards. This arrow indicates that all actions made by the agent
in a given discourse rest on a hidden truth. Indeed, characteristic
of all discourse is that a repressed element motivates the agent’s
actions, and that this repression engenders the possibility of a
social bond, represented at the upper level of the discourses.
In a similar vein, “truth” also has an effect on the position of
the “other,” which Lacan emphasizes by drawing an additional
(diagonal) arrow.
The arrow pointing downwards (right side of Figure 1)
indicates that the agent’s address to the other has effects: a
“product” is created. This product fuels the agent, but occupies a
disjunctive position in relation to the truth that set the discourse
in motion.
In the discourse of the master (see Figure 2), a master
signifier (S1) is formulated by the agent, and imposed onto
the other who is presumed to function by means of knowledge
FIGURE 1 | The overall structure of the discourses and the relations
between all positions (based on Lacan, 1969–1970, p. 93, 196; Lacan,
1972, p. 40).
3As Bianchi (2012, p. 116) indicates: “Discourse is in fact etymologically derived
from the Latin discursus: i.e. to run from a place to another. The Lacanian discourse
is in fact a structural system of places and relations that regulates the interaction
between these terms, i.e. their currere from a place to another and their mutual
exchange of positions.”
4At first Lacan denotes the position of the ‘agent’ as the position of desire (Lacan,
1969–1970, p. 93).
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FIGURE 2 | Discourse of the master, discourse of the hysteric, discourse of the university and discourse of the analyst (based on: Lacan, 1972, p. 40).
(S2). Characteristically, such a domineering move rests on the
repression of subjective division ($), and as a product the other is
reduced to the position of an object (a). For example a therapist
may tell his phobic client to be brave (S1) and to face the crowds
he is afraid of by adhering to specific instructions as to how one
might behave in groups (S2). By adopting such a directive style
the therapist puts his own uncertainty in social situations ($)
aside, and by obeying the therapist, the client is reduced to a
pawn in the game of social interactions, whichwill finally produce
further discontent (a) that might engender the formulation of
new directives (S1).
Central to the discourse of the hysteric is the active
formulation of complaints ($) and the search for an other who
is presumed to have an answer (S1) for what bothers the subject.
This discourse represses the truth that all desire rests on a
lack that cannot be alleviated (a), and typically results in the
production of narratives (S2) that don’t solve the fundamental
lack (a), but actually engender further irritation ($).
The discourse of the university builds on the proclamation of
knowledge (S2). Such knowledge always rests on the acceptance
of dogmas and assumptions (S1), but this is neglected in this
discourse. Characteristically, the other is put in the place of
the object (a). This produces discontent ($), which fuels further
knowledge creation (S2).
Finally, in the discourse of the analyst, the analyst qua agent
confronts the other with a so-called object a, logically notated a.
The object a refers to a drive or jouissance-related remainder that
cannot be named and that fuels desire5. For example, the analyst’s
5In Seminar XVI Lacan describes the object a as follows “I have said that the a
is that which conditions the distinction between the I qua support of the field of
silence, which often baﬄes the analysand who expects reciprocity
in the interaction, can function as an object a (see Lacan, 1971, p.
25). By occupying the place of the object (a) the analyst creates a
place where, via free associative speech, subjective division can be
articulated ($). In order to pay close attention to the singularity
of the patient the analyst puts aside pre-established ideas about
patients and pathologies (S2), such that key signifiers that mark
the analysand’s subjectivity (S1) can be formulated, which fuels
the analyst’s positioning qua object a.
SEMBLANCE AND JOUISSANCE IN
DISCOURSE
In Seminar XVIII (e.g., Lacan, 1971, p. 25) and Seminar XIX,
Lacan (e.g., Lacan, 1971–1972, p. 67) somewhat rearticulated the
positions he first entitled as “agent,” “other,” and “product” (see
Figure 3), indicating that engaging in discourse above all means
that one makes use of semblance. During his teaching Lacan
interpreted the concept of semblance in various ways (Grigg,
2007). In the nineteen fifties he uses the concept semblance
(“le semblant”) to refer to the world of appearances that is
installed by means of the Imaginary. At that moment semblance
is an imaginary phenomenon that needs to be distinguished
from the Symbolic. As Lacan developed his discourse theory
this all changed profoundly. At this point he suggests that
the Other, which can add up as the field of knowledge, and the “I of jouissance”
(1968-69, p. 135, my translation). In this context, the “I of jouissance” refers to the
fact that as a corporeally living being I’m marked by the drive. “I qua support of
the field of the Other,” in its turn, refers to the fact that I make use of language to
signify myself and the world.
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FIGURE 3 | Overall structure of the discourses Lacan discerns in
Seminar XIX (based on Lacan, 1971–1972, p. 67, 193; Lacan,
1972, p. 40).
the fact of social relations as such implies semblance, which
is expressed in the following statement: “discourse as such is
always discourse of semblance” (Lacan, 1971–1972, p. 226, my
translation). Henceforth, discourse unfolds when someone forges
a position in relation to another; semblance is “the proper object
based on which the economy of the discourse regulates itself ”
(Lacan, 1971, p. 18, my translation). For example, the discourse
of the master takes shape if someone plays the role of the
commanding agent.
In seminar XIX, the position of the other is described as the
position of jouissance (Lacan, 1971–1972, p. 193). Here Lacan
defines jouissance as a disturbing dimension in the experience
of the body, which renders the subject unable to experience
itself as a self-sufficient enjoying entity (Lacan, 1971–1972, p.
217). Jouissance is immensely disruptive. It is a dimension of
otherness that we all have to deal with. Indeed, the very idea
of “dealing with it” bears witness to discourse; that is, to the
fact that we treat jouissance by making an appeal to an agent or
semblance, which is expected to manage it: jouissance provokes
the mobilization of semblance. The root of jouissance is in the
structurally dysfunctional status that the body has for the human
being (Lacan, 1971–1972, p. 217).
What is typical for discourse, is that it envelopes a semblance
around jouissance, and as a result jouissance is no longer
unlimited, but conditioned by the element occupying the position
of semblance. In this maneuver, a social bond is created: “What
is discourse? It is that which, in the arrangement of what might
be produced because of the existence of language, makes up the
function of the social bond” (Lacan, 1972, p. 51, my translation).
SURPLUS-JOUISSANCE AS THE
PRODUCT OF DISCOURSE
In the early nineteen seventies Lacan frequently points out that
the product of discourse makes up a “surplus-jouissance” (e.g.,
Lacan, 1971–1972, p. 193). In forging his concept “surplus-
jouissance” Lacan builds on Marx’s concept “surplus value.” In
Marx’s Capital (1999), the notion of surplus value is defined as
the difference between the exchange value of products of labor
(commodities) and the value that coincides with the effort of
producing these products, i.e., the means of production and labor
power. In our market economy system, Marx says, money is the
pre-eminent criterion to measure the amount of the value that is
realized. Within the capitalist system gaining surplus value seems
to be the sole aim. Profit-making and the expansion of capital are
the motives that drive capitalism. However, gaining surplus value
is only possible by selling fetishized commodities for a price that
is higher than the value attributed to labor that produced them. If
equivalent values are exchanged, no surplus value can be realized.
Marx indicates that the realization of this aim depends on
a trick, and it is this cunning trick that interests Lacan (1968–
1969, pp. 64–65; Vanheule and Verhaeghe, 2004). In the market
the capitalist buys labor power in order to produce merchandise.
Marx states that the trick put into practice in this process is that
the capitalist pays the laborer as much as he has to, but less than
the market value of what the laborer actually produced. In other
words, in the process of exchanging value (labor power/money)
the capitalist pockets a monetary surplus behind the back of the
laborer, and behaves as if he too worked hard during the process
of production. Here Marx states that the capitalist must hide his
smile: “after a hearty laugh, he re-assumes his usual mien” (Marx,
1999, p. 126). This laughter results from the fact that the value
that is created during a workday is actually much higher than
what the capitalist pays the laborer.
Capitalist production implies that one no longer works solely
in order to satisfy needs, and stops once they have been met.
Production continues beyond satisfying needs, which results
in a fetishist relation to surplus value (Tomšicˇ, 2012, 2015).
Lacan (1968–1969, pp. 64–65) concludes that the secret gain of
surplus value is both the product and the motor of the capitalist
production system. Yet, despite the appropriation of surplus
value, Marx stresses that the capitalist does not personally enjoy
what he gains. The capitalist is only the support that makes the
system run. Therefore, what the capitalist system produces are
suppositions and phantasies of gratification, while in fact nobody
enjoys (McGowan, 2004). Indeed, this is what Lacan also stresses
when addressing Marx’s socio-economic analyses: “There is only
one social symptom: each individual actually is a proletarian”
(Lacan, 1974, p. 187, my translation).
Furthermore, Lacan suggests that the general structure of
discourse is “homologous” to the system of capitalism described
by Marx, and this is why the above discussion of surplus value is
relevant. Both systems produce an element of excess, in relation
to which a fetishist relation is created. In capitalist production
surplus value and/or commodities are fetishized, while in the use
of discourse a fetishist relation with surplus-jouissance (plus-de-
jouir) is created (Lacan, 1968–1969, p. 45; Tomšicˇ, 2012).
Homology means that their structure is identical (Regnault,
2005): while coming in a different form, the use of discourse and
capitalist production obey the same logic. As we use discourse
language is produced, in the capitalist system commodities are
produced. Yet, through the process of exchange something
is lost. By using discourse one is robbed of something: in
attempting to address jouissance by means of language, and find
a solution for it through the social bond, the experience of an
un-articulated “beyond” is produced. Using signifiers to name
jouissance confronts the speaker with a dose of corporeal tension
that is not inherent to language: a surplus-jouissance that can
only be located in phantasy or delusion comes to the fore. It
is precisely at this point that the function of laughter can be
situated. In Marx’s system, laughter refers to the capitalist’s gain
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of surplus value, and to the process of alienation that this entails.
In the use of discourse, laughter refers to the surplus-jouissance
inherent in our alienation in the signifier.
In explaining surplus-jouissance, Lacan points to the joke. As
we speak we invariably also utter nonsense, and because of this
we laugh. Yet, why exactly does the joke provoke laughter? Lacan
(1968–1969, p. 64, my translation) suggests the following: “it [the
joke] provokes laughter, in the end, to the extent that it is actually
hooked to the failure inherent to knowledge.” The pursuit of
meaning through speech implies deadlocks. Speech is always a
half-saying (mi-dire). It misses its point, and this failure coincides
with a dose of jouissance, to which laughter bears witness.
Consequently, surplus-jouissance has a status of lack and loss
(Tomšicˇ, 2015)—language use always misses the point; expressed
by downward arrow in the formulae for discourse—and at the
same time makes discourse function as an endless attempt to get
hold of what one misses; expressed by the diagonal arrow from
surplus-jouissance/product to semblance/agent. Furthermore, by
connecting the manifestation of surplus-jouissance to laughter
and misrepresentation, Lacan situates surplus-jouissance at
the level of the unconscious (Lacan, 1971, p. 21). In Marx’s
production system the capitalist laughs with the money the
system generates; in Lacan’s model the user of discourse laughs
to the extent that, at the level of the unconscious, a surplus
of jouissance is produced which one fails to get hold of. The
unconscious concerns the combined expression of half-saying
and surplus-jouissance.
In the discourse of the master the object a is a component of
libidinous corporeality that is delineated by the use of signifiers,
but is not represented bymeans of the signifier. It is what remains
leftover after imposing knowledge (S2) onto jouissance. Qua
element of symbolic nothingness, the object a nonetheless makes
itself felt as corporeal tension, gravitating around a gaze, a voice,
or in the element of oral nothingness to be taken in, and anal
nothingness to be given away. In the end, this surplus-jouissance
is juxtaposed with the master signifier (S1), but, as mentioned
previously, it doesn’t correspond to the truth that the discourse
was initially fueled by. In the end the discourse of the master
stresses the fact that there is no hope that subjective division
can ever be transcended, or that discontent can be resolved
if we address jouissance by means of language, which is what
we typically do. Unbehagen is structurally unsolvable, which is
expressed in the formula by the fact that none of the arrows arrive
at $. It is precisely the failure that coincides with the discourse of
the master that, in Lacan’s reasoning, makes analytical discourse
possible. Through the exploration of subjective discord via free
association, there is a return in the analysis to the signifiers that
connote and mark the subject.
In most discussions of surplus-jouissance, Lacan starts from
the master discourse. In the discourse of the master the object a is
the surplus that the semblant is confronted with. Yet, in terms of
Lacan’s later discussions of the structure of discourse (Figure 3),
surplus-jouissance is not identical to the object a, but the end
position of each discourse (Lacan, 1971–1972, p. 193). In the
discourse of the university the divided subject occupies this place;
in the discourse of the hysteric it is unconscious knowledge that
emerges; and in the discourse of the analyst the master signifier
makes up the surplus-jouissance.
NON-RAPPORT IS THE MISSING
FUNDAMENT OF ALL DISCOURSE
The outcome that discourse creates is always at odds with the
truth that first mobilized the turn to the Other. This is what
the absence of an arrow between “surplus-jouissance”/“product”
and “truth” indicates (Figures 1, 3): the consequence of discourse
has nothing to do with the truth that first set it in motion.
Conversely, the product of discourse does not leave the agent
or semblance unaffected, which is what the diagonal arrow
pointing from “product” back up to the “agent” refers to.
Indeed, Lacan repeatedly stresses that the invariant experience
of impossibility that characterizes the connection between
agent/semblance and other/jouissance builds on a fundamental
non-rapport. Underlying the relation between agent/semblant
and other/jouissance a fundamental non-rapport can be found
between truth and product/surplus-jouissance, which Lacan
sometimes marked by a small triangle (N)(Figure 4) or a double
slash (//).
In this line of reasoning the concept “rapport” has a specific
meaning. Lacan defines the relationship between two elements in
terms of a “rapport” if the laws that govern their bond are fixed.
If this is the case, the relationship “can be written” (Lacan, 1971,
p. 65, my translation). In this view, gravitation is a relationship
that can be written: starting from knowledge of the physical
properties of an object, like its mass and its density, formulas
make it possible to calculate how long it will take to touch the
ground when the object falls from a given height.
Applied to sexuality it could be argued that the way male
and female animals interact is fairly uniform, and depends only
marginally on how two specific specimens behave. Yet as soon as
our focus is on humans, the nature of relationships is not a priori
FIGURE 4 | Overall structure of the discourses that Lacan discerns, including the non-rapport at the basis of the relationship between agent/semblant
and other/jouissance (based on: Lacan, 1969–1970, p. 151).
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given. In this context Lacan (1971–1972, p. 18, my translation)
notes “the inability to formulate a precise rule at this point.” A
sexual relation is not installed on the basis of the correct triggers
being projected, but is always contingent, and shaped through the
encounter between two speaking beings: “So it is in a discourse
that natural men and women, as one might say, have to valorize
themselves as such” (Lacan, 1971, p. 146, my translation). Thus,
in humans the sexual relationship cannot be written: it cannot be
formalized in terms of fixed rules that apply to each particular
relationship: “The Other is absent from the moment that what is
at stake is the sexual relationship” (Lacan, 1971–1972, p. 104, my
translation). That’s why Lacan qualifies the sexual relationship as
a non-rapport. In this context he also mentions a “deficiency of
the sexual rapport” (Lacan, 1971, p. 167, my translation), which
indicates that there is no signifier that might name what a sexual
relation consists of. The only things humans are left with are
speech and discourse, which for Lacan (1971, pp. 83, 148) should
be thought of as an effect of the non-rapport. Indeed, all speech
on the sexual non-rapport is a mere “half-saying” (Lacan, 1971–
1972, p. 12, my translation), meaning speech that is ever besides
the point. The fundamental inability that is inherent to the sexual
relationship cannot be solved by means of the signifier: “sexual
encounters always fail” (Lacan, 1971–1972, p. 27, my translation),
which produces a state of desperation (Lacan, 1971–1972, p. 115).
The only option individuals are left with is inventing ways of
dealing with the non-rapport.
As a consequence, in Lacan’s view the sexual relationship is
Real. It is “that which does not stop not being written” (Lacan,
1972–1973, p. 57, my translation). This implies that in order
to establish a bond between individuals, speech must always
be mobilized. Indeed, given the non-rapport at the basis of all
relationships, we cannot but make use of discourse, which opens
up a field of semblance: “For the boy, what is at stake in adult
age, is acting-a-man [faire-homme]. This is what constitutes the
relation to the other party... one of the essential correlates of
this acting-a-man, is to indicate to the girl that one is so. In a
word, we find ourselves put right away in the dimension of the
semblance” (Lacan, 1971, p. 32, my translation). A male person
is not automatically “man” in relation to a woman. Only by
manifesting oneself as a man or a woman in discourse can a
bond between partners take shape. In other words: the sexual
relationship is Real and cannot be written; what remains open is
the possibility of engaging oneself in a sexual relation. This is only
possible through the use of discourse (see also Vanheule, 2014).
CAPITALIST DISCOURSE6
From the late 1960s on, Lacan occasionally commented on
the particularities of capitalist discourse, highlighting how it
differs from the four discourses he first discerned. A systematic
discussion or theory on this discourse cannot be found in his
work. In this section I provide a reading of Lacan’s work on this
6A different interpretation of hypermodern discourse, which does not follow
Lacan’s fifth discourse, but takes Lacan’s discourse theory as its point of departure,
has been provided by Jacques-Alain Miller (2005). Bryant (2008) in his turn
situates the capitalist discourse as just one of four discourses in the universe of
capitalism, the others being the discourse of bio-power, the discourse of immaterial
production, and the discourse of critical theory.
topic, and aim at formulating a more comprehensive idea on the
particularities of the capitalist discourse. Other interpretations of
this fifth discourse can be found in the works of Bruno (2010),
Bryant (2008), Pavón-Cuéllar (2009), and Tomšicˇ (2015). As
Bianchi (2012) correctly indicates, with his fifth discourse Lacan
gives a non-Marxian account of capitalist culture, stressing the
logic of consumption rather than the mode of production that
capitalism implies. This is also how I interpret Lacan’s capitalist
discourse. Later interpretations of Lacan’s fifth discourse do not
focus only on the dynamics of consumerism, but make explicit
links with Marxism and explore dynamics of production as well
(e.g., Bryant, 2008; Pavón-Cuéllar, 2009).
On one occasion, during a 1972 lecture at the University of
Milan, entitled du discours psychanalytique, Lacan articulated
a model on the precise structure of capitalist discourse
(see Figure 5). This model coheres with Lacan’s initial four
discourses, but cannot be seen as just another variant in the
series of discourses. After all, Lacan’s four discourses have a
strict structure: four positions are linked by means of five
unidirectional arrows (Figures 1, 3); and 4 elements ($, S1, S2,
and a) rotate in a fixed order across these positions (Figure 2).
The discourse of the capitalist disrupts this structure, and is a
“mutant” of the discourse of the master. Indeed, Lacan (1972,
p. 48) understands capitalist discourse as the contemporary
variant of the classic discourse of the master. Yet with regard
to the discourse of the master, it contains 3 mutations7 (Lacan,
1972, p. 40):
(1) $ and S1 exchange places.
(2) The arrow pointing upward on the left that makes the
position of the truth unattainable in the classic discourse
changes now into an arrow pointing downwards.
(3) The upper horizontal arrow that made the connection
between “agent” and “other,” or “semblance” and
“jouissance,” disappears.
The effect of these three changes is that a number of
obstructions that are inherent to the four discourses are
not characteristic of the fifth discourse. We can circulate within
the capitalist discourse like go-carts on a racetrack. Indeed, in
the capitalist discourse, the non-rapport is circumvented.
Tomšicˇ (2015, p. 220) describes this as follows: “The
vectors show that the capitalist discourse is grounded on
the foreclosure of the impossibility of totalization that marks
other discourses, an impossibility that is structurally determined
by the fact that the signifiers constitute an open system of
differences.”
Specifically, in the four standard discourses the position
of truth is not targeted by an arrow, and the positions of
“agent”/“semblance” and “other”/“jouissance” are influenced by
two (not mutually related) other positions, which makes its
functioning structurally lapse. In the capitalist discourse, “a very
7Not all authors who discuss Lacan’s fifth discourse take into account these three
mutations. For example, Bryant (2008) only takes into account Lacan’s suggestion
that in capitalist discourse $ and S1 exchange places, but not the two other
mutations he points to. Such a partial reading has important weaknesses. For
example, the decline of the social bond and the changing position of truth, which
are proper to the regime of capitalism (see e.g., Miller, 1993; Žižek, 1999) remain
underexposed.
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FIGURE 5 | Capitalist discourse (based on: Lacan, 1972, p. 40).
small inversion between the S1 and the $, which is the subject, is
enough for it to run as if it were on wheels, it can’t run better,
but it actually runs too fast, it runs out, it runs out such that it
burns itself out”8 (Lacan, 1972, p. 48, my translation). Indeed,
what is structurally characteristic of the discourse of the capitalist
is that while the four positions remain intact, the pathways made
up by the arrows change: in all positions one arrow arrives, such
that a closed circuit of arrows is created. The structural lapse that
marks the four standard discourses cannot be found at the root
of this fifth discourse, which, so to speak, makes it run on wheels.
Yet Lacan suggests that in the end the one functioning along the
lines of this smoothly running process burns himself out, and gets
consumed. One idea that the above quote articulates, is that in the
capitalist discourse subjectivity is corrupted. The main structural
reason for this is that in this discourse, the distance between $
and a is lost: corporeal tension that is proper to surplus jouissance
disturbs the subject.
Just like in the discourse of the hysteric $ is situated at the level
of the agent/semblance. Indeed, the discourse of the capitalist
essentially starts from the experience of subjective division. In
line with his earlier work, Lacan suggests that the subject is,
on the one hand, a connotative effect of language use—“the
signifier is what represents a subject for another signifier” (Lacan,
1972, p. 51, my translation). On the other hand, the subject
is determined by the object a, which is the structural cause of
desire—“The object a is the true support of what we have seen
function, and it functions so in a more and more pure way to
specify each in his desire” (Lacan, 1972, p. 52, my translation).
Yet, most characteristically, man is marked by sexuality, which
is not instinctively organized, and makes up “that in which man
never feels at ease at all” (Lacan, 1972, p. 38, my translation). In
the discourse of the hysteric the Unbehagen thus obtained results
in an address to the other. Capitalist discourse, by contrast, does
not capitalize on the social relation: “capitalism, that was its
starting point: getting rid of sex” (Lacan, 1974, p. 34). Indeed, the
capitalist discourse directly aims at the root of the problem, which
is what the downward arrow on the left indicates. This discourse
does not encapsulate the discomfort of subjective division as
structural, but aims to recuperate discontent in its very system.
It is a discourse in which there are answers for this discomfort:
there exists an S1 that answers the $ and functions as a truth for
8In French the text goes as follows: “une toute petite inversion simplement entre le
S1 et le $, qui est le sujet, ça suffit à ce que ça marche comme sur des roulettes, ça
ne peut pas marcher mieux, mais justement ça marche trop vite, ça se consomme,
ça se consomme si bien que ça se consume.” In my translation the reference to
consumption is lost, yet translating the French verbs “se consommer” and “se
consumer” as “to consume” largely misses the clue of the sentence, which is the
idea that the very success of this discourse is also its own fiasco.
the divided subject. For example, in our contemporary Western
consumption culture, discontent is often deemed the upshot of
having not yet obtained the right object and suggests that a
state of subjective satisfaction will be reached once this object
is obtained. In other words, the semblance of being dissatisfied
can be answered with the S1 of a brand name or a product that
offers the promise of satisfaction. Capitalist discourse actively
cultivates the semblance of dissatisfaction, as well as a fantasy
of self-sufficiency, completeness and vitality (Tomšicˇ, 2015). The
market9 tells us what we need: the merchandise it provides. These
are all S1’s: they are isolated signifiers that consumers take to
be the truth of their discontent. Indeed, within the capitalist
discourse, the products that make up the market constitute a
despotic truth to which the subject is subjected.
The move from $ to S1 reflects a denial of the structural
quality of subjective division. On the one hand the capitalist
discourse starts from subjective division, yet, on the other hand
the move toward S1 suggests that subjective division might be
overcome through alienation in a master signifier. This bears
witness to a perversion-like movement: while in perversion
“the subject takes care himself to compensate for the flaw
of the Other” (Lacan, 1968–1969, p. 265, my translation), in
capitalist discourse an S1 is carefully promoted to compensate
for the flaw of the subject. In both cases, subjective flaw is
believed to be corrigible, which is why the discourse of the
capitalist is often described in terms of a generalized perversion
(Mura, 2015). In line with this interpretation Lacan (unpublished
document, 6 January 1972 meeting, my translation), postulates a
rejection of symbolic castration at the basis of the discourse of
capitalism: “What distinguishes the capitalistic discourse is this:
Verwerfung, rejection, rejection outside all fields of the symbolic
... of castration.” Within the capitalistic logic, the lack at the heart
of subjectivity is not seen as a structural consequence of using
signifiers, but an accidental frustration that can be remedied
within the market of supply and demand. The assumption that
an S1 exists for each discomfort is ingrained in this discourse.
As a result, capitalist discourse implies a particularization of
desire, treated as if it is a demand. Whereas in classic discourse
desire is singular in that it cannot be solved by means of the
signifier, the capitalist discourse suggests that particular solutions
for dealing with subjective division actually exist: the market is
there to satisfy customers’ demands. Consequently, at the point of
desire, the capitalistic logic leads to exploitation: “the exploitation
of desire, this is the big invention of capitalist discourse” (Lacan,
1973a, p. 97, my translation). This discourse exploits desire
by treating it as a specific question to be answered by means
of practical solutions. The superego command characteristic
of capitalist times concerns an obligation to satisfy desire via
consumption (McGowan, 2004). The market provides streams of
products and services that are there to answer peoples’ demands.
Lacan suggests that this has a tranquilizing effect: “we couldn’t
do anything better so that people comport themselves with a little
tranquility” (Lacan, 1973a, p. 97, my translation). However, as we
9Lacan (1969–1970, p. 92) closely links the idea of the market to the master
signifier.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 December 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1948
Vanheule Capitalist Discourse, Subjectivity and Lacanian Psychoanalysis
will see later, this also happens at the point of subjectivity for a
certain price.
Interestingly, following Žižek, Bryant (2008, p. 13) suggests
that under the regime of capitalism, the subject’s principal
question is not “what do I desire” but “what should I desire,”
which is “not a question about objects, but a question of those
conditions under which the subject might be desired by the
Other.” Indeed, it is a basic Lacanian tenet that the desire
governing the subject is essentially mediated by the desire of
the Other: “man’s desire is the Other’s desire” (Lacan, 1960, p.
690). Within capitalist discourse this implies that merchandise
will not so much be preferred for its intrinsic qualities, but in
terms of how it is evaluated by the other. Indeed, this is often how
marketing proceeds, products are presented as highly desired by
celebrities, which directs the consumer’s desire.
Obviously, such exploitation of desire only works because the
S1 that the capitalist discourse formulates as an answer is not at
all random: S1 refers to an entire knowledge apparatus, S2, which
guarantees the adequacy of the answer. Indeed, according to
Lacan (1969–1970), there is compatibility between contemporary
science and the capitalist discourse. In his view, the capitalist’s
discourse is engaged in a “curious copulation with science”
(Lacan, 1969–1970, p. 110). Science ensures10 the development
of S2, through which S1 grows ever more innovative and, as a
result, old answers must be constantly replaced by new ones.
Within the capitalist discourse, S1 is not a fixed anchorage, but
a solution that is replaced by endlessly better solutions. The fact
of the matter is that the innovation of S2 continuously recreates
both S1 and the demand. The only thing that the system needs
is the consumer: subjects that are prepared to translate their
discord $ in terms of the gap in the market that is delineated by
S2, and who believe in S1.
Moreover, the switch between S1 and $ reveals something
about what is taken seriously. In the discourse of the master, it
is a signifier that is taken seriously: an S1 is adopted, and around
this signifier a world of semblance is created through which the
other and jouissance are addressed, which is what the upper
horizontal arrow indicates. In the discourse of the capitalist, by
contrast, it is discontent that is taken seriously. In this respect,
10Lacan (1969–1970, p. 110) indicates that the imperative of science comes down
to “Keep on knowing in a certain field.”
the capitalist discourse resembles the discourse of the hysteric
(Figure 6).
However, in the discourse of the hysteric, discontent is
addressed to another who, as an authority, is supposed to have
the answer (S1). This is expressed by the horizontal arrow. Such a
move in the direction of the other remains absent in the discourse
of the capitalist. In the discourse of the hysteric the move toward
the other socializes or communalizes discontent. Discontent
becomes an issue for which the other is equally responsible.
Along this way, desire qua irresolvable dimension that needs to
be recognized by the other is created. A classic example of this
can be found in the butcher’s wife’s dream discussed by Freud
in The Interpretation of Dreams. The woman in question found
nothing more pleasurable than eating caviar, but forbade her
husband to give it to her. In the same way, this woman knows
that her friend likes nothing better than salmon and has a dream
in which she cannot buy salmon. In this sense, refusing the object
of satisfaction protects her subjectivity. It allows her to articulate
questions over and beyond the fish and its eggs: the question as
to what makes a woman attractive and the question of what her
husband desires. Questions of this type can only be articulated to
the extent that instant satisfaction is rejected. The preservation of
the lack creates space for questions about love and identity.
The capitalist discourse follows a different logic, in that it
takes desire as if it was a frustrated demand. It translates desire
into solutions, meaning desire is not seen as the support of
subjectivity, but merely seen as a demand that should be gratified.
Why all the misery, the capitalistic logic would ask: caviar or
salmon can simply be bought, right? In this way, what the
discourse of the capitalist fills is the space for questions pertaining
to love and desire: Lacan states “Any order, any discourse that
resembles capitalism leaves aside what we will simply call the
things of love, my friends. You see, that’s just nothing” (Lacan,
1971–1972, 6 January 1972 lecture, my translation). Within this
discourse subjective division is not seen as a manifestation of
subjective truth along the lines of the unconscious, but as a state
of permanent crisis the subject needs to get rid of (Pavón-Cuéllar,
2009).
When everything is gratification of demands, something at the
root of the social bond gets lost (Declercq, 2006). The search
associated with living with questions of existence (“who am
I?” “what do you want from me?”) is replaced by a search for
FIGURE 6 | Capitalist discourse and discourse of the hysteric (based on: Lacan, 1972, p. 40).
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solutions in dealing with corporeal tension, and for experiences
of fulfillment. Yet in Lacan’s view, the net result that the
discourse of the capitalist and master end up with is similar.
Both end up producing the object a; a component of nonsensical
libidinous corporeality that is created by using signifiers, but not
represented by means of the signifier.
How can we understand this idea of producing an object a by
means of capitalist discourse? Characteristically, this discourse
implies a consumer ($) purchasing commodities or services at
the market (S1), paying for them according to the exchange
value the market dictates. Yet, once the consumer possesses
or consumes the product, it is reduced to its use value. The
S1 the consumer possesses is now brought into dialogue with
the other signifiers that populate his world (S2). This does not
so much create pleasure or fulfillment, but always implies a
process of sobering up: in the end the consumption product
is just an artifact among artifacts; a signifier among signifiers.
Something that was of value when purchasing the product, which
was ascribed to the product when it was still on the market,
and which is no longer there when the consumer possesses the
product: the commodity never delivers the hoped for satisfaction
and “is always surrounded by a halo of disappointment in which
unrequited desire painfully persists” (Bryant, 2008, p. 14). The
anticipated glamor is lost, which is why the product has only
one destiny: waste. Therefore, in line with Mura (2015, p. 166),
it could be argued that “the production and consumption of
success and satisfaction are consubstantial in the discourse of the
capitalist with the production and consumption of both failure
and emptiness.” What is produced is surplus-jouissance, which,
in the next step, fires the Unbehagen or crisis at the level of
the individual. The arrow from a to $ in the formula (Figure 5)
makes clear that this object a plagues the subject, which again
creates the move from $ to S1. Thus, what is the capitalist
discourse’s answer to the discontent that previous consumption
entailed? more consumption! As mentioned above, in Lacan’s
view the continuous circulation within the circuit of the capitalist
discourse burns the subject out (Lacan, 1972, p. 48). What really
gets consumed in capitalist discourse is desire itself: “the subject is
suspended in the uncodable terrain of a contradictory circularity
between success and failure, satisfaction and emptiness, limitless
credit and limitless debt” (Mura, 2015, p. 170).
Just like the capitalist discourse, in the discourse of the
hysteric the subject is also affected by a (Figure 6). Yet, contrary
to what takes place in the discourse of the capitalist, $ is
also determined by S2. This means that in the discourse of
the hysteric unconscious knowledge with a status of surplus-
jouissance determines the subject. In the capitalist discourse,
by contrast such determination remains absent. Indeed, under
“capitalist exploitation” we are all “proletarians” because we are
dispossessed from our knowledge, says Lacan (1969–1970, p.
33). Here, the knowledge that makes up the unconscious, and
that determines the subject gets side-tracked: “What, in a type
of subversion, gets returned to him is something different—
master’s knowledge” (Lacan, 1969–1970, p. 33). As Bruno (1993)
indicates, this is why the agent in the capitalist discourse ($)
is not so much the divided subject, with his unconscious from
the discourse of the hysteric, but an individual who is plagued
by a jouissance-related element (a), which is not determined
by unconscious knowledge. Lacan qualifies this individual who
gets dispossessed of his unconscious knowledge as a proletarian
(Declercq, 2006).
The capitalist discourse implies a particular relation between
the subject ($) and the object (a), which, as the arrows indicate,
is the only element affecting the subject. Living in terms of the
market of services and solutions (S1 → S2) does not gratify
the subject, as was anticipated by the move from $ to S1, but
stirs corporeal tension. Consumption does not satisfy demand or
desire, but exalts and exhausts the individual, who is haunted by
an object that makes a strong appeal onto the subject.
An example of such a relation can be found in the gambler’s
relation to his game. The gambler knows that the game will not
provide ultimate gratification, yet, at the same time he denies this
lack and feels attracted to the glamor the game implies. Bjerg
(2009, p. 59) describes this well: “he [the gambler] ascribes to
the game a certain gaze by which the world of objects looks
back at him. In the expression, ‘fortune smiles at him,’ there
is the idea of a certain power (fortune) addressing (smiling at)
precisely me. In this way, the game sees something special in the
gambler, which is not otherwise visible.” The gambler fetishizes
the game, which appeals to him and drives him to play the game.
More broadly, the same holds true for capitalist consumption.
The consumer knows rationally that consumption doesn’t make
him happy, yet at the same time the consumer feels attracted by
something sublime, which he hopes to get hold of via the market
(S1). Marketing and publicity exploit this fetishization. What
the consumer meanwhile doesn’t realize is that what makes him
dream of the sublime is a lost cause (a) that cannot be recuperated
by means of discourse.
From a clinical perspective, this shift from a master
discourse to a capitalist discourse is evidenced in certain
changes in contemporary psychopathology, and has brought
about much discussion among Lacanians regarding, what they
call, contemporary symptoms (e.g., Miller, 1993; Loose, 2002;
Verhaeghe, 2004, 2014; Voruz and Wolf, 2007; Goldman-
Baldwin et al., 2011; Redmond, 2013). Such symptoms, including
addiction, panic or borderline states of functioning, are not
thought of as metaphorical constructions that need deciphering,
but as subjective expressions of, and reactions to, overwhelming
surplus jouissance (i.e., mentally devastating corporeal tension).
In other words, these symptoms no longer primarily reflect
conflict and impossibility in relation to the other, but crises in
response to a confrontation with the fundamental non-rapport.
LACAN’S SOLUTION: THE SAINT
To what extent does psychoanalysis offer a way out of the
capitalist discourse, and can it subvert the consumer’s particular
relation to the object a? In Television (1974), an edited version
of a television interview with Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan’s
reflection on the figure of “the saint” is most interesting at this
respect (see also Bruno, 2010). In a section of this complex text,
Lacan (1974, pp. 19–20) compares the psychoanalyst with the
saint and concludes the following: “The more saints, the more
laughter; that’s my principle, to wit, the way out of capitalist
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discourse—which will not constitute progress, if it happens only
for some” (Lacan, 1974, p. 20). This comment not only underlines
the social inequality that capitalism implies, but stresses that
contemporary subjectivity does not necessarily have to remain
caught in the logic of the capitalist discourse. Indeed, in his
view psychoanalysis offers the possibility of a way out of the
maddening journey that the fifth discourse entails. On this point
he makes the following remark: “So let’s turn to the psychoanalyst
and not beat about the bush ... Because there is no better way of
placing him objectively than in relation to what was in the past
called: being a saint” (Lacan, 1974, p. 19). The saintly behaviors
he has in mind have nothing to do with being compassionate or
doing good. Lacan had already clearly differentiated such ethics
of charity from the ethics of psychoanalysis during a discussion
of the Christian Saint Martin, in Seminar VII (1959–1960). Later,
in Television, Lacan returns to this idea: “A saint’s business, to put
it clearly, is not caritas” (Lacan, 1974, p. 19).
Echoing writings on the Taoist sage, as well as the seventeenth
century philosopher Baltasar Gracián, Lacan situates the saint’s
actions relative to the idea of detachment: “the saint is the
refuse of jouissance” (Lacan, 1974, p. 20; Dulsster, 2015). Thus,
he situates the psychoanalyst’s actions outside of the market
of demand and supply, and outside the game of exaltation
and disappointment. Psychoanalytic work should refrain from
responding symmetrically to the solution-seeking consumer, and
radically put aside the illusory mode of gratification implied in
capitalist discourse.
The solution he puts forth consists of firmly holding on
to the discourse of the psychoanalyst. This means that on
the one hand the analyst should incarnate the object a, and
personify the lost cause or abject-side of the object a: “he acts
as trash” (Lacan, 1974, p. 19). Indeed, the analyst should not
be stirred by the object, like the consumer is ($), and not
present himself as the sublime solution (S1) for the crisis of
the subject. Rather, the analyst takes into account the deadlock
of the non-rapport, and challenges the subject to approach the
object a in a different way. Hence Lacan’s reference to the
laughter of the saint: laughter bears witness to the evanescent
nature of surplus-jouissance. The saint’s laughter makes clear
that properly dealing with the object a does not reside in the
endless attempt to obtain a solution, but in finding a sinthome
or savoir-faire in relation to its plaguing surplus-jouissance
(see e.g., Verhaeghe and Declercq, 2002; Voruz and Wolf,
2007).
On the other hand, and closely connected to the object
a position he occupies, Lacan suggests that the psychoanalyst
should create a platform where the structural division of the
subject can be articulated, which corresponds to the position of
$ at the place of the other in the discourse of the psychoanalyst.
In capitalist discourse, subjective division is believed to be
accidental and corrigible. Psychoanalysis, by contrast, assumes
that subjective division is inherent to human existence and
indicative of the unconscious. Therefore, the psychoanalyst
occupies the position of the object: “So as to embody what the
structure entails, namely allowing the subject, the subject of the
unconscious, to take him as the cause of the subject’s own desire”
(Lacan, 1974, p. 19).
Both in the capitalist discourse and in the discourse of
the psychoanalyst a direct relation between the object a and
the divided subject can be observed (a → $). Yet, as Bruno
(2010, pp. 207–208; 259–260) indicates, the respective positions
differ, and the connecting arrow has a different status. In the
discourse of the psychoanalyst a connection is made between
agent and other (indicated by the horizontal arrow), along which
a relation marked by non-rapport is installed. In this discourse
a is manifested as a guarantee for the gap in $. In the capitalist
discourse, by contrast, a is a haunting surplus that provokes
Unbehagen in the subject and motivates the continuous purchase
of new solutions.
CAPITALIST DISCOURSE IN CLINICAL
PRACTICE: A BLESSING OR A CURSE?
How do these reflections translate into clinical work? I will
explore this question with two clinical vignettes. The first,
Nick, concerns a case that I situate in the clinical structure
of obsessional neurosis. The second, Marc, concerns a case
that bears witness to the clinical structure of autistic psychosis
(Strubbe, 2011)11. In discussing these vignettes I will not discuss
the details of the diagnosis. What the cases will hopefully
illustrate is that, clinically speaking, capitalist discourse can both
corrupt and/or protect the subject. At first sight this contradicts
Lacan, who emphasized the corrupting impact of capitalism.
Yet, in the case of psychosis, where an a priori exclusion from
discourse stands to the fore, this might be different.
When discussing the capitalist discourse, Lacan presents it
as a mode of relating to others that, at least partly, replaces
the traditional discourse of the master. The capitalist discourse
transforms the way in which the subject traditionally takes shape,
and gives rise to new kinds of symptoms, as well as consumerist
requests for help. What is characteristic of the consumerist
request for help is that it ignores unconscious truth. In the
discourse formula this is reflected in the position of the left
arrow. Indeed, in neurosis, themain challenge in the clinical work
consists in bringing the analysand to the point of exploring the
unconscious determinants of subjective distress, thus implying a
turn to the four discourses. After all, Lacan (1969–1970) indicates
that the master discourse not only articulates the elementary
social bond, but also expresses how the unconscious functions
(Clemens and Grigg, 2006): signifiers (S1) that accidentally slip
into speech challenge the knowledge (S2) one has about one’s
self, thus creating the dimension of a divided subject ($), as well
as surplus-jouissance (a), prompting a continuous articulation of
such signifiers (S1).
By contrast, in psychosis, the subject is principally positioned
outside discourse. In his paper l’étourdit Lacan (1973b, p. 490)
suggests that in psychosis no established discourse represents
the subject12. This implies that in order to deal with the non-
rapport, a semblance that provides stability has to be invented
(Miller, 2004). Indeed, in psychosis a semblance that represents
11In the original case study the link with Lacan’s discourse theory in general, or
with capitalist discourse in particular is not made.
12“l’hors-discours de la psychose” (Lacan, 1973b, p. 490).
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the subject, and enables a social bond is not installed discursively,
implying that it needs to be actively established through an
inventive act. By adopting a semblance, and adhering to it strictly,
confrontations with the non-rapport are avoided. In my opinion,
the capitalist discourse promotes a specific type of semblance
that might function as a support in psychosis: the persona of the
consumer who checks the market for solutions that might solve
dissatisfaction. Capitalist discourse opens amarket with solutions
for distress, thus avoiding a confrontation with the fundamental
non-rapport and with basic questions of existence, like “who am
I” or “what do I want?” In case of psychosis such avoidance
is functional since a signifier for addressing these issues is
lacking, as Lacan’s hypothesis of foreclosure makes clear (Lacan,
1959; Vanheule, 2011; Redmond, 2013). Conversely, when the
semblance is challenged radically, and no longer functions as the
hinge around which identity can turn, the subject is reduced to an
object in relation to a voracious jouissance, which is unbearable.
In what follows I explore these ideas via two cases.
Nick is a successful 35-year-old architect, initially consulting
me because of two symptoms he seeks relief from: he suffers from
ADHD, which was first noticed by his ex-wife and then diagnosed
by a psychologist, and he suffers with sexual problems in relation
to his current partner, which, as he explains, might be a side
effect of the medication (Ritalin) he takes. Concerning his life
history he mentions a divorce about 1 year ago, indicating that he
still maintains excellent relations with his former wife. Boredom
made them split up he says.Medication helped him realize that he
is often distracted, and suffers from difficulties organizing his life.
With respect to his ADHD, Nick particularly complains of
an inability to concentrate for long times, which interferes with
work and with social relationships. He is perpetually distracted
and agitated, and it is for this agitation in particular that he wants
to obtain a solution. Indeed, at first a problem-solving question
stands to the fore: Nick wants to counter the corporeal tension
that disturbs him. Nick is willing to engage in talking therapy, but
ultimately he wants an answer: questions he frequently returns
to include “do I really have ADHD?,” “is the medication good
for me?,” “how can I handle the ADHD?” Thus considered
Nick’s attitude differs from the one Freud observed in Studies
on Hysteria. Using hypnosis, Freud wanted to address specific
symptoms that his patients suffered from, but instead of focussing
their attention on the symptom, they talked elaborately about
surrounding experiences, which eventually made Freud change
his method. Nick’s attitude is different in that, on the one hand, he
is willing to talk, but on the other hand, he expects that after the
talking I will offer him a solution, that is: an S1 that might solve
the discontent ($) revolving around the disturbing excitation
experienced (a). Within such logic subjective discomfort is
something to be managed; not something that needs to be
explored in detail because it could reveal who one is, hence the
limit in the desire to talk.
What is crucial to analytic work in the context of neurosis
is that we aim for a shift in the relation to the consumerist
demand for solutions. By continuously inviting the analysand to
speak about situations associated with the experience of discord,
a shift toward the discourse of the hysteric is realized. Such a
shift implies that discontent about the non-rapport in relation
to the other is no longer buried under a maddening search for
solutions, but gradually brought to the fore as a point around
which the subject is positioned. Indeed, in the discourse of the
analyst the analysand’s discontent is taken seriously, with the aim
of exploring key signifiers around which the analysand articulates
choices in life.
As new issues come to the fore, conflict is induced in his
self-experience. First Nick expresses a deep anxiety about failing
in relation to other people, particularly his ex-wife, his current
partner, and his mother. He wants things to go well, avoids
conflict, and describes himself as “a pleaser.” He continually tries
to second guess what other people want and then takes action,
with the aim of giving people what he imagines they want. Nick
almost literally aims at wanting what others want, and at fulfilling
this demand, which, as discussed above, bears witness to how
desire is shaped under capitalism. For example, when cooking
in the evening he never knows what he wants and searches for
clues concerning the dish he presumes the other wants. Similarly,
he explains, that up until then, he never expressed preferences
for holiday destinations. What he would do is listen to his
wife’s preferences, and then plan their vacations around this,
telling himself that he wants what she wants. The semblance of
subjective preference or discord ($) observed in his wife is not
brought into a dialogue within the social bond, as is the case in the
discourse of the hysteric. Rather, Nick identifies with it, and aims
at immediately saturating it with an answer. Along that way he
not only mortifies desire, by reducing it to the status of a demand,
but also avoids expressing his own preferences, which would
present him in a desiring position in relation to others. “I don’t
want to disrupt the other’s pleasure” he says. Paradoxically, this
search for gratification does not have a long-standing gratifying
effect, but provokes a feeling of unease and a sense of boredom in
close relationships.
As similar situations return in his speech, in subsequent
sessions Nick realizes that in the years that they were married,
he and his wife never argued. Moreover, during these years,
his attention deficit symptoms, which his ex-wife observed, first
came to the fore. When she was talking to him, he could not
focus for a long time on what she was saying. His mind drifted
to other topics, and he felt restless. In the end, he and his
ex-wife lost intimate interest in each other. The mutual sexual
attraction dissipated and without further dispute they broke up.
Most remarkably what was absent from their relationship was
an explicit struggle or search for ways of managing the non-
rapport at the basis of their mutual connection. It can be argued
that, in terms of Lacan’s theory, the couple were organized along
the lines of the capitalist discourse, with Nick in the role of the
consumer who models his desire to the preferences of the other,
and who looks for solutions that solve dissatisfaction. For him,
dissatisfaction is not something to be discussed, but something to
be managed. Yet, the solutions that he presents to his wife satisfy
her desire only temporarily. Ultimately these solutions simply
evoked further dissatisfaction on her side (S2), which confronted
him with a surplus-jouissance (a) that he could not get rid of, as
expressed in his restlessness and attention difficulties. However,
the very act of addressing his habitual mode of relating to his wife
implies a shift toward the discourse of the hysteric. His mode of
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relating to her is no longer self-evident to him, but becomes an
object of inquiry and reflection.
In terms of his sexual problems in his current relationship,
which Nick gradually begins to discuss in detail, a similar logic
can be discerned. On the one hand, Nick expresses feelings of
happiness with his new partner, indicating that meeting her has
truly enriched his life, and stimulated his creativity. On the other
hand, he suffers from falling short sexually. While discussing the
situation in detail, it becomes clear that actually his new partner
has strong sexual yearnings, and often longs for sex while he is not
in the mood for it. Typically, Nick succumbs and starts cuddling
her, which bears witness to his attempt to mold his desire to hers,
and to engage in a search for gratification. Yet, at this point his
body fails to obey his own will, resulting in erection difficulties.
These difficulties bear witness to his own unconscious desire,
which is not satisfied by the act of intercourse. The erection
difficulties lay bare the extreme satisfaction-oriented position he
occupies. The physical inability prevents him from occupying his
habitual position on the market of human demand and supply,
which provokes a state of crisis ($), for which he considers taking
medication to treat erectile dysfunction.
Nick’s initial position in the transference resembles a capitalist
discourse, asking me to provide a solution for his symptoms.
Yet, via the psychoanalytic sessions, a change in position is
evident. A number of interventions, like “Why concentrate on
being a pleaser?” or “you will never get rid of your symptoms
unless you learn how to have conflict,” surprise him. On the one
hand the analyst is not in the problem-solving position that he
anticipated him to be: symptoms are not tackled by means of
precise solutions. On the other hand he suddenly recognizes the
satisfaction-oriented position that he usually ends up in, and he
starts to wonder what it is that determines his actions. At this
point his speech resembles the discourse of the hysteric: Nick
stops taking the ADHD medication; and starts talking about
characteristic relations and incidents in the family, about the
turbulent period he goes through with his partner, and about his
job as an architect. Holding on to analytic discourse myself, Nick
observes and starts to explore the details of his tendency to please,
gradually shifting to other discourses in relation to others.
Nick’s functioning along the lines of the capitalist discourse
bears witness to denying subjective division, which is countered
by a strict use of analytic discourse. This enables a switch to
the hysteric discourse, in which Nick begins to question his own
mode of subjective functioning.
In Marc’s case, by contrast, the use capitalist discourse has a
stabilizing effect.
Marc is a 43-year-old ICT specialist, with a competitive job in
an international company. One of his hobbies, which he qualifies
as an obsession, is watching Japanese animation, also called
anime. However, recently, an event turned his life upside down:
the police searched his house and found pornographic images
of minors on his computer. Marc is shocked and overwhelmed
by panic. He didn’t realize that he was doing illegal things.
Often Japanese animation films have a sexual component, and
by downloading these films, pornographic images that circulate
under the alias “anime” were also copied to his PC. Marc is
aware of this problem, but removed these pictures. Yet, the police
traced his activities and put him under surveillance. Marc is
overwhelmed and confused. After all, the idea of living within the
boundaries of the law is a fundamental principle he strongly holds
on to. The subjective crisis Marc lives through makes clear that
anime functioned as a master signifier, helping him to position
himself in the world.
Professionally, Marc is the head of a department within an
ICT company. In running his team Marc starts from the idea
that just like algorithmsmake a computer run, social relations are
made up of algorithms. All one needs to do is apply the correct
social algorithm in the correct context. Along that way he learned
how to make eye contact; observed that in discussing things
one shouldn’t insist too long; and found out that humor means
saying the opposite of what you intend. The algorithm is a master
signifier (S1) that he, qua consumer ($), easily adopts because
it is presumed to reveal the truth about how human relations
function. However, his algorithmic approach is not perfect. One
day a colleague asked him how he feels when working under
strong pressure. Marc never thought about that issue, and was
baﬄed by the question.
Marc states that visual images are important to him, and
that he has a photographic memory. One day he had to make
an apparatus consisting of more than 30 pieces. He had no
manual, and at first he couldn’t do it. Suddenly when driving
his car he saw the solution, and could fix the machine in 30 s.
“Being autistic has its advantages” he says. Importantly, at this
level anime had an important function for Marc. He explains
that visual stimuli are often overwhelming, and that he needs
anime images to process other images he is confronted with.
For example, social relations often confuse him, and anime
helped him to organize his world: “it was my model of the
world. Anime often deals with the topic of love. I learned
how to relate to a woman, like by giving her a flower, and
things like that. Without animation I would never have met
my wife.” The fictional universe of anime functioned as an
instrumental framework that helped him manage relationships
with other people. Considered from the perspective of discourse
theory, anime was an S1 that reflected the truth of how human
relations are organized, and provided him with instrumental
knowledge (S2), that helped him to identify with the role of
the consumer ($) and thus avoid brutal confrontations with
the other.
As he didn’t have anime at his disposal anymore, Marc
ended up in chaos. Suddenly, actions of the other provoke a
highly uncomfortable and haunting tension. Surplus-jouissance
(a) urges him to find new ways of behaving as a consumer ($)
on the market of supply and demand. During our sessions, he
aimed at “speaking about emotions in a non-emotional way.”
Indeed, Marc has a precise idea about our sessions: they should
be a sounding board for rational reflection on emotional issues.
The function he attributes to the analyst consists of offering a
platform where rational solutions can be found, far removed
from the subject supposed to know which motivates transference
in neurosis. His approach fits the logic of Lacan’s capitalist
discourse: sessions with the psychoanalyst make up amarketplace
where he looks for suitable alternatives for the lost Japanese
animation.
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Most particularly, Marc is troubled by the fact of living with
his wife. He says that her “orders” are often contradictory, which
is extremely difficult since he cannot but try to fulfill all of her
demands. In terms of Lacan’s capitalist discourse, Marc aims at
finding an S1 for all of his wife’s demands, with which he as a
subject identifies ($). Yet, since losing the framework of anime,
his solutions (S1) are also lost, which leaves him with no escape
form the surplus-jouissance (a) that overwhelms him: “her orders
literally consume me” he says. Indeed, without the framework of
anime he becomes identified as the object of jouissance for the
other, which is an unbearable position that can only be solved by
inventing a new solution.
The analyst’s answer to Marc’s problems and demands doesn’t
consist of installing a hysterical discourse. Given the autistic
structure inMarc’s functioning, questioning his subjectivity is not
seen as a way out of the chaos that he is confronted with. Instead,
the analyst focuses on finding a new instrumental framework
such that Marc can again deal with the non-rapport that he is
confronted with in relation to his wife. During the sessions Marc
evaluates different solutions. He proves to be inventive, but clings
to the analyst’s opinion in terms of validating the adequacy of
what he invents.
Stand-up comedians provide a first alternative to anime. He
observes that comedians often joke about the difference between
men and women, and learns from them that women often ask
for the things a man cannot give. This idea has a pacifying effect,
helping Marc to deal with his wife’s demands. Next to that he
holds on to the idea that women’s menstrual cycle explains how
they feel and behave. This insight helps him to frame his spouse’s
emotional expressions. Finally, Marc begins to classify his wife’s
demands according to the system they use at his place of work.
When clients present demands and requests they are classified
hierarchically in terms of their urgency. “Major” demands require
direct action, while “trivial” demands can be solved when no
urgent requests are waiting. To his surprise Marc concludes that
not all “orders” his wife articulates are equally urgent. Depending
on formal characteristics, like the pitch, tempo and timing of
what she says he is able to interpret the urgency of what she
articulates. Actions that were capricious at first now become
predictable, which solves the experience of chaos that he was
confronted with. In line with the logic of Lacan’s capitalist
discourse the classification system helps Marc to frame his wife’s
capricious “orders” as demands, with which he identifies ($). Now
he activates instrumental solutions (S1) that provide him with
knowledge (S2) concerning the other. By enveloping the other
with an S2, the other’s jouissance which reduces him to a mere
object is avoided.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I discussed Lacan’s (1972) reflections on the
capitalist discourse, a fifth discourse introduced after the classic
four discourses. In his view, the capitalist discourse partly
replaced the discourse of the master, which implies an important
shift in how the subject and the other deal with their fundamental
non-rapport. The capitalist discourse implies identification with
the semblance of the consumer who shops for solutions that
make up the truth of his discontent. However, artifacts offered
on the market cannot provide the hoped for satisfaction and
instead produce surplus-jouissance, which provokes Unbehagen
or crisis at the level of the individual. In neurosis the discourse of
the capitalist functions as an attempt to ignore the sexual non-
rapport and the dimension of the unconscious. Consequently,
psychoanalytic work with patients caught up in this discourse
implies a shift to the discourse of the hysteric, and thus how
the individual relates to symptoms and complaints. Psychosis,
by contrast, is marked by an a priori exclusion from discourse.
In psychosis, the capitalist discourse might provide a way out
of the tricky position of being a mere object of jouissance
to the other. Indeed, the right-hand downward arrow in
the capitalist discourse could be interpreted as representing
the position of being an object a in relation to a veracious
jouissance. Consumerist ways of relating to the other might
offer the individual a semblance and thus a way out of this
deadlock, such that a mode of relating to others can be
invented.
This line of reasoning implies that the capitalist discourse
should not be disqualified per se. Lacan’s discussion of the
capitalist discourse, by contrast, is inherently critical. However,
as he qualifies the discourse of the capitalist as a contemporary
mutant of the discourse of the master, it seems that Lacan only
focused on neurosis, and did not discuss the implications for
psychosis. I believe that if we take into account both neurosis
and psychosis, Lacan’s capitalist discourse offers a promising
framework for understanding clinical problems in which the so-
called “administration of jouissance” stands to the fore (Loose,
2002). As the cases discussed in this paper illustrate, problems
such as ADHD and autism obey this logic, but addictions, eating
disorders and some anxiety disorders might be fruitfully studied
from this perspective.
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